the U.S. Srategy in During Linebacker II Air Campaign

37). On the basis of this assumption, death chair Lyndon Johnson do the decision in 1965 to commit "U.S. armed forces to storm to save South Vietnam from being overrun by communist aggression from northward Vietnam" (Sharp, 1978, p. 1). The legions strategy adopted at the time was one of "gradualism." This meant that, rather than making an all-out safari to end the conflict as quickly as possible, the unify States would start out with minimal involvement and then gradu ally increase its air attacks and other forms of military intervention against north-central Vietnam (Burdick, 1984, p. 214). This approach was adopted because it showed the seriousness of U.S. intentions and bolstered the morale of the South Vietnamese people, while simultaneously showing China and the Soviet confederation "that American goals were limited and did not threaten the existence of their ally" (Burdick, 1984, p. 214). However, gradualism limited the effectiveness of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. In particular, it prohibited an all-out display of American air origin until the final stages of the war. It can only be wondered whether an earlier physical exertion of air power might have brought the conflict in Vietnam to a quicker and easier resolution.

U.S. air bombing raids into North Vietnam increase notably during the summer of 1972. This increase came about in

Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant. (1978). Strategy for defeat: Vietnam in retrospect. San Rafael, Ca.: Presidio Press.

front to the first attack on December 14, 1972, U.S. military leading developed a concise plan to achieve their objectives with the accessible resources. The plan basically called for the color bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam. The B-52s were prepared to attack in waves throughout the night, with tactical forces from the 7th Air Force "striking targets in the sidereal day under visual flight conditions, if the weather permitted" (Momyer, 1978, p. 240). Linebacker II was initially intended to be a three-day campaign; however, preparations were made to follow-up the three-day effort with as many more strikes as necessary to get the job done.

The targets chosen were in the areas of the study North Vietnamese cities, Hanoi and Haiphong. This was because those cities were the centers for the transportation industry of North Vietnam. In addition, the two cities were the centers for the enemy's logistic systems and the storage of military weapons and supplies. causality plants, airfields, SAM sites, communications installations and command and control facilities were also targeted in the general area (Momyer, 1978, p. 241). Although the Linebacker II strategy called for saturation bombing, emphasis was placed on attacking only military targets and avoiding noncombatant locations. In order to get a " rugged message across to the North Vietnamese" while minimizing civilian casualties, U.S. planners "not only picked targets to avoid population centers but completed procedures (bomb runs and instructions) that would also avoid people" (Werrell, 1987, p. 52).

Momyer, W. W. (1978). Air power in three wars. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Diplomacy by scare: What the bombing did. (1973, 8 January). Newsweek 81, pp. 10-12.

Crowl, P. A. (1977, 6 October). The strategist's short catechism: Six questions withou
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